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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No, 880161

v,
RALPH LEROY MENZIES,

Category No. 1

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the first
degree, a capital felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5202 (1990), and aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(i) (Supp. 1990) because the appeal is from a district court
in a criminal case involving a capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court correct when it determined that

the court reporter at defendant's trial was de facto certified,
or does the reporter's certification status preclude use of the
transcript prepared by her for purposes of appeal?

The court's

legal conclusion of the reporter's status is based on factual
findings made by the court; the legal conclusions are reviewed
under a correction of error standard and the factual

determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard•
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Oates v. Chavez,
749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988)•
2.

Did the trial court correctly determine that, in

spite of errors, the original transcript prepared in this matter
was sufficiently accurate to afford defendant his appellate
review?

The same standard of review as that cited in issue 1

applies to this issue as well.
3.

Will defendant be prejudiced by use of this

transcript for his appeal?

The trial court's conclusion that

this transcript is adequate to afford defendant a fair and full
appellate review is reviewed under the same standard as the first
two issues.
4.

Does use of this transcript violate defendant's

rights under the federal and the state constitutions?

This issue

was not presented to the court below and is reviewed under the
plain error doctrine.

State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026 and

n.3 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35
(Utah 1989) ) .
5.

Is the issue of inclusion of a prosecutor's

comments into the record after trial and sentencing properly
before this Court, given that the State has stipulated to their
removal from the record?
point.

There is no standard for reviewing this

By stipulation, the comments are not part of the record

and are not an issue for appellate review.

-2-

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a trial by jury in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
district judge, presiding, defendant was convicted on March 8,
1988, of criminal homicide, murder in the first degree, a capital
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1990), and
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation on
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 844
and 898-99).

Defendant was sentenced to death on March 23, 1988,

and the court signed an order to that effect on March 30, 1988
(R. at 1098-1100).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal on April

22, 1988 (R. at 1108) .
On November 15, 1989, defendant filed a motion to set
aside the judgment, conviction and sentence, or, in the
alternative, for a new trial. This motion was based on
defendant's allegation that the transcript of his trial was
inaccurate and that proper review of his trial could not be
conducted using that transcript (R. at 1222-28).

Several

hearings were conducted regarding the transcript, and
modifications of the records were proposed (R. at 1814-1929).

On

December 26, 1990, Judge Uno signed an order denying defendant's
motion to set aside judgment and/or for a new trial.

Judge Uno

determined that the original transcript, "despite numerous
-3-

errors," was "sufficiently accurate to afford defendant a full
and fair review of his issues to be raised on appeal."
1192-93).

(R. at

Judge Uno ordered that the original transcript be

certified to this Court for review of defendant's case.

He also

ordered that a copy of the transcript, "interlineated by
defendant's counsel and containing [the reporter's] version of
her . . . notes," be transmitted to this Court as part of the
appellate record (R. at 1193).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A statement of the facts of the crime will not be given
because the only issue before the Court in this brief is the
sufficiency of the trial transcript to afford defendant a full
and fair appellate review.
In January 1988, Tauni Lee (formerly Byrd) was the
sole applicant to fill a vacancy as court reporter for Judge Uno
in the Third Judicial District Court (R. 11661 at 3 3 and
Defendant's Exhibit [hereafter Def. Exh.] #3). Ms. Lee had
attended school in California, graduating from a business college
with a degree in court reporting (R. 1166 at 98).

She sat for

the California certified shorthand reporter examination in 1985,
passed the test with 97 percent, and became 3icensed in that
state as a certified shorthand reporter (CSR) (R. 1166 at 99-100
1

The transcripts of hearings held on the motion for new
trial are paginated internally and have a sequential record
number on the title page of each separate transcript. The
transcripts involving the new trial and rule 11, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, hearings will be cited first to the record
number of the transcript, then to the internal page within the
transcript.
-4-

and State's Exhibit [hereafter St* Exh.] #31). The license was
valid for five years; however, a yearly licensing fee was
assessed to keep the license current (R. 1166 at 100). Ms. Lee's
California license became delinquent in April 1987, when she
failed to pay the yearly fee (Def. Exh. #2 and R. 1166 at 100).
She did not pay the fee because she was moving to Utah and
thought that she did not need to keep the California license
current (R. 1166 at 100).
When Ms. Lee came to Utah, she sought and received the
registered professional reporter (RPR) certificate from the
National Shorthand Reporters Association; it was her
understanding that she needed this national certificate to work
in Utah.

This certificate was granted on the basis of her having

passed the California CSR examination (R. 1166 at 101). She did
not seek a Utah certificate because she did not know that she
needed one; she thought that the national certificate was
sufficient (R. 1166 at 16, 107 and 156-57).

Ms. Lee reported

defendant's trial in February and March of 1988 (R. 1166 at 108).
The Court Administrator's Office was aware that Ms. Lee
did not have a valid Utah CSR license; however, she was hired
because she was the only applicant, she had been licensed in
California, and Ronald Gibson, Deputy Court Administrator,
determined that Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17 allowed her to work
until the next Utah test was given (R. 1166 at 82-83).
Apparently, in May 1988, Mr. Gibson became concerned at
representations being made by Ms. Lee about the length of time
-5-

she was going to need to complete the transcript of defendant's
trial (Def. Exh. # 6). Mr. Gibson also learned that Ms. Lee was
experiencing problems with California courts because she was
delinquent in forwarding transcripts of California cases she had
reported before coming to Utah (Def. Exh. #9).
Mr. Gibson expressed his concerns to Ms. Lee and she
informed him that she was using a note reader to assist in
preparation of the transcript; this procedure was slow because
the note reader could only work every other week.

Mr. Gibson and

Ms. Lee agreed that she would be placed on leave-with-pay status
on the weeks opposite those during which the note reader was
preparing the transcript; this would allow the transcript to be
completed by July 1988 (Memo of May 17, 1988 in Def. Exh. #3
[also found as Def. Exh. #6] and R. 1166 at 67-70).

This Court

extended the date by which Ms. Lee was ordered to complete this
transcript to September 6, 1988, and, to that end, Ms. Lee was
relieved of her in-court duties on August 29, 1988 (Def. Exh. #13
and 14 and R. 1166 at 75-76).

Ms. Lee completed the transcript

by September 6, 1988 and her employment with the Third District
Court was terminated on September 7, 1988. The reasons given for
the termination were habitual tardiness and absenteeism, a
security breach problem, and slow preparation of transcripts (R.
1166 at 78-79 and Def. Exh. 16). The termination did not relate
specifically to defendant's case; Mr. Gibson never received any
complaints regarding the accuracy or quality of her work (R. 1166
at 80).
-6-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Lee's licensing status does not preclude the use of
the transcript of defendant's trial. While Ms. Lee did not apply
for and obtain a Utah license so that she could legally use the
appellation "Certified Shorthand Reporter" in Utah, she had been
trained and was licensed in California and nationally as a
certified shorthand reporter.

The Court Reporters and

Stenographers Act and the Code of Judicial Administration provide
for appointment of qualified reporters to act as official court
reporters in certain circumstances, even if they do not have a
Utah CSR license.

The trial court correctly determined that Ms.

Lee was qualified, although not licensed in Utah, to report
defendant's trial.
It is defendant's burden to demonstrate that this
transcript is inadequate for review and cannot be corrected by
use of the procedures in rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The trial court did not err in determining that the

transcript, while it did contain errors, was adequate for
appellate review.

None of the errors cited by defendant are

significant, nor are they incapable of being corrected by reading
them in context.

Because the transcript is adequate for

appellate review, defendant will not be prejudiced by its use.
The federal constitution does not require a perfect
transcript; it requires a transcript of sufficient completeness
to allow for proper consideration of defendant's claims. This
constitutional requirement is met by this transcript.
-7-

Defendant

has not analyzed a different standard under the state
constitution for reviewing the sufficiency of this transcript;
consequently, this Court should decline to conduct a separate
state constitutional analysis.
A prosecutor's comments which were added to the record
two months after defendant's sentencing has been removed from the
record by stipulation and is not a ground for appellate review,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH STATUTES DO NOT PRECLUDE THE USE OF THIS
TRANSCRIPT.
Defendant first claims that Utah statutes preclude the
use of this transcript; specifically, he cites the Court
Reporters and Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et
seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2).

Analysis of this point

involves the interplay of several statutes and rules.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1990), cited by defendant, mandates an
automatic review of his conviction and sentence "within 60 days
after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record
unless time is extended[.]"

This statute does not address what

constitutes an adequate record for purposes of appellate review.
Other statutes and rules delineate the qualifications
and duties of court reporters.

The provisions do not specify

what should occur when a transcript is challenged as insufficient
for appellate review; however, they do establish a framework for
understanding the appointment of a court reporter and establish
an evidentiary burden on the party challenging the adequacy of
-8-

the record.

Rule 80, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1991)

(repealed May 1, 1991), provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Appointment of reporters. The judges
of the district courts may appoint reporters
to report the proceedings of the court.
(b) Duties. It shall be the duty of the
reporter to attend all sessions of the court,
and to record in full the evidence given and
all proceedings had therein, including
proceedings at any pretrial, except when the
judge dispenses with his[/her] services in a
particular cause or with respect to a portion
of the proceedings thereof. The reporter
shall file with the clerk forthwith the
original record required to be taken at a
trial or hearing, and, when requested so to
do, shall with reasonable diligence furnish
any party a transcript of the record of the
evidence and proceedings, or any part
thereof, upon payment of the fees required by
law. Any transcript of the evidence of
proceedings shall be made in accordance with
the requirements of Subdivision (d) of Rule
10, relating to the type of paper, kind of
type, and margins of pleadings and other
papers filed with the clerk.
This rule was repealed recently, perhaps because its language and
purpose overlap with provisions of the Court Reporters and
Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et seq. (1987 and
Supp. 1990).
Certain provisions of that act, read together,
demonstrate that Ms. Lee's licensing status is not the
determining factor in deciding whether this transcript may be
used for appellate review.

The act distinguishes between a

shorthand reporter and a certified shorthand reporter.
shorthand reporter is
defined to mean any person who is engaged in
the practice of making by use of symbols or
abbreviations a verbatim record of any trial,
-9-

A

proceeding, or hearing before any district
court . . . of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-14 (1987).

To use the appellation

"shorthand reporter," one need not be certified by any state or
licensing authority, one need only be engaged in the practice of
using symbols to make a verbatim record of any court proceeding.
The duties of the shorthand reporter are listed in the act:
The shorthand reporter shall attend all
sessions of the court, and take full
stenographic notes of the evidence given and
of all proceedings of each session, except
when the judge dispenses with his[/her]
services in a particular cause or for a
portion of the proceedings. The reporter
shall file with the clerk forthwith the
original stenographic notes required to be
taken at a trial or hearing, and, when
requested, shall with reasonable diligence
furnish the defendant in a criminal cause, .
. . a transcript of the stenographic notes of
the evidence and proceedings, or any part of
it, upon payment of the fees as provided.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-2 (1987).
The act establishes a presumption that certain
transcripts are correct.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 (1987) states

that "[a] transcript of a reporter's notes, written in longhand
or typewritten, certified by him[/her] as being a correct
transcript of evidence and proceedings, is prima facie a correct
statement of such evidence and proceedings."

(Emphasis added).

A reporter is not required by this statute or Utah Code Ann. §
78-56-14 (defining "shorthand reporter") to be certified by any
state or licensing authority before he or she may certify a
transcript as correct under this section.

-10-

The act does require a different eligibility standard
for regular district court reporters.

The statute regarding

appointment of reporters in a district court reads:
No person may be appointed to the position
of shorthand reporter nor act in that
capacity in any district court . . . of this
state, . . . unless he[/she] has received a
certificate from the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing as provided in
this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15 (1987).

The granting of a certificate

is an administrative matter controlled by Utah Code Ann. § 78-5616 (1987), which states:
Any citizen of the United States at least
18 years of age, of good moral character, who
possesses a high degree of skill and ability
in the art of shorthand reporting, and who
passes a satisfactory examination as provided
in this chapter, is entitled to a certificate
and shall be known as a certified shorthand
reporter.
If a reporter meets these qualifications, he or she is entitled
to the certificate and to be known as a certified shorthand
reporter.

If the qualifications are met, the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing does not appear to have
any discretion about granting the certificate.
The statutes cited thus far establish that a regular
district court reporter must normally be Utah certified; however,
provision has been made for emergency situations when a Utah
certified reporter is not available.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17

(1987) allows the appointment of temporary substitutes in the
place of regularly appointed court reporters.
reads:
-11-

That statute

If any regularly appointed certified
shorthand reporter is disabled from
performing his[/her] duty or is removed from
his[/her] position, the judge of the court in
which that certified shorthand reporter has
been appointed may appoint any substitute
he[/she] deems competent to act during the
temporary disability of the regular reporter
and until his [/her] successor is appointed.
The temporary appointment shall continue only
until the next regular examination for
certified shorthand reporters held by the
Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
The act provides criminal penalties for violation of any of its
provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-19 (1987); the act does not
state or imply that a transcript prepared in violation of the act
cannot be used for appellate review.
In conjunction with the Court Reporters and
Stenographers Act, rule 3-304, Code of Judicial Administration
(1991), establishes "uniform administrative policies governing
the appointment . . . of official court reporters serving in the
various district courts of the state."

The rule provides the

standards of qualification for serving as an official court
reporter; i.e., that the reporter be licensed by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing.

However, the rule also

states that "the state court administrator may authorize
exceptions to this required qualification in the event that
certified shorthand reporters are not available or an official
court reporter or a graduate of an accredited court reporting
school is deemed competent, but is not licensed for reasons
unrelated to satisfactory performance as an official court
reporter[.]"

Rule 3-304 (2) (A), Code of Judicial Administration.
-12-

George Weiler of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing testified that they had no record that Ms.
Lee had ever applied for or received a license from the state of
Utah to be a CSR (R. 1166 at 7-9). Ms. Lee never claimed that
she had received a separate Utah CSR license; she obtained a
national RPR designation on the basis of having passed the CSR
examination in California (R. 1166 at 101 and 107). During 1987,
a person received a Utah CSR if she applied and took the Utah
exam or had a current license from another state (R. 1166 at 910).

Utah exams were given in June and December of 1987 (R. 1166

at 10). According to Mr. Weiler, the division recognized that
the court administrator's office had "a separate set of rules,"
whereby they were allowed to use qualified people on a temporary
basis without a Utah license (R. 1166 at 11).
After hearing the evidence and argument regarding Ms.
Lee's licensing status, Judge Uno concluded that "although she
was not [Utah] licensed as a court reporter, she was qualified to
report this trial" (R. 1186 at 5 [hearing held July 6, 1990]).
This conclusion is supported by the evidence and should be
upheld.
Ms. Lee was the sole applicant for the position in
Judge Uno's courtroom (R. 1166 at 82).

She had passed the

California examination and had received the CSR designation in
that state; she had also worked for courts in California (R. 1166
at 100-104).

Based on this information, which apparently was

known to Judge Uno, he was entitled to appoint Ms. Lee to serve
-13-

as his courtroom reporter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17; her
appointment was also appropriate under rule 3-304, Code of
Judicial Administration.

This appointment was valid "until the

next regular examination" held by the licensing division.
Defendant's trial was held during the time that Ms. Lee was
authorized to act as Judge Uno's reporter.
Ms. Lee's licensing status did not preclude her acting
as reporter for Judge Uno; neither does it invalidate the
transcript which was prepared in this case.

Indeed, the

transcript is presumed correct unless proven otherwise.
Consequently, defendant's argument that Utah law precludes use of
the transcript prepared by Ms. Lee is without merit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
TRANSCRIPT PREPARED IN THIS MATTER IS
ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH APPELLATE
REVIEW.
Defendant's second claim of error is that appellate
review of his case is impossible because of inaccuracies in the
transcript.
A. Defendant has the Burden of Establishing that the
Transcript is Inadequate for Appellate Review.
Defendant contends that the state must establish the
accuracy of the transcript of his trial in order for the
transcript to be used in reviewing his conviction.

The rules of

appellate procedure and case law demonstrate that it is the
appellant's burden to show that the appellate record is
insufficient and that the insufficiency cannot be rectified by
-14-

procedures mandated by the rules of appellate procedure.

Rule

11(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, dictates that the
appellant "shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and
(e) of this rule and shall take any other action necessary to
enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the
record."

Rule 11 provides a means by which the record may be

corrected or modified, including the means by which the record
may be settled if the parties will not stipulate to a corrected
record.

Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The

advisory committee note to this provision states:
This paragraph applies whenever there is a
question as to whether the transcript or the
original papers accurately reflect what
occurred in the district court. These
disputes should usually be submitted to the
district court since it will ordinarily be in
the best position to ascertain the
correctness of the record.
(quoted in State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 1990)).
In this matter, defendant's trial was reported and
transcribed.

In the arguably more serious circumstance of lost

reporter's notes and unreported proceedings, this Court has
directed recourse to rule 11(h) proceedings to settle the record.
Even in that context, this Court has required the appellant to
show that the procedures provided by this rule for reconstructing
and settling the record are inadequate.

See Emig v. Hayward, 703

P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Perry, 136
Wis.2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1987).

The burden was and is on

defendant to show the district court and this Court that the

-15-

provisions of rule 11(h) were inadequate to provide a sufficient
record for review by this Court.
B. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that this
Record is Adequate for Appellate Review.
Defendant next presents a litany of "failings" by the
court reporter in an attempt to show that the transcript is
inadequate for review.

The state has never claimed that the

transcript is without flaw; neither did the trial judge so find.
Just as no defendant is guaranteed a perfect trial, no defendant
is guaranteed a perfect transcript.

People v. Feigin, 174 Cal.

App.2d 553, 345 P.2d 273, 281 (Cal. App. 1959).

This may be the

basis for including a provision for correcting a record in the
rules of appellate procedure.

The United States Supreme Court,

in the context of the duty of the state toward indigent
defendants, held that the state must provide an indigent with the
same adequate and effective review as that given a defendant with
funds.

The Court stated:
In terms of a trial record, this means that
the State must afford the indigent a "'record
of sufficient completeness' to permit proper
consideration of [his] claims." [Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487,] 499 . . .(quoting
Coppedge v. United States [sic], 369 U.S.
438, 446 . . . (1962))A "record of sufficient completeness" does
not translate automatically into a complete
verbatim transcript. . . . We considered
this more fully in Draper v. Washington
[sic], supra, 372 U.S., at 495-496:
"Alternative methods of reporting trial
proceedings are permissible if they place
before the appellate court an equivalent
report of the events at trial from which
the appellant's contentions arise."
-16-

Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971).

The constitutional

requirement is a record sufficient to permit appellate review,
not a perfect record.
In State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), this
Court found that inaudible responses by a prospective juror on
voir dire could not be reconstructed because of "significant gaps
in the transcript."

.Id. at 447 n.3.

Given the responses which

were capable of being transcribed, in conjunction with a
reluctance to assume what the inaudible answers were, this Court
found the record in that case to be inadequate and a new trial
was appropriate.

In a case somewhat similar to the present case,

the Utah Court of Appeals distinguished Taylor.

The court of

appeals addressed a situation in which the court reporter had
left the state and another reporter had prepared the transcript,
using the written notes of the absent reporter.

In State v.

Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232
(1990), the court of appeals stated that the court reporter's
transcripts were "virtually complete and thus amply adequate for
[the court] to review defendant's claims."

Ld. at 910. The

court found the transcript to be "functionally adequate for
review.

Not all deficiencies or inaccuracies in the record

require a new trial." Jd. (citing State v. Perry, 136 Wis.2d 92,
401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1987).

In Perry, the Wisconsin Supreme

Court stated:
It is equally clear that not all
deficiencies in the record nor all
inaccuracies require a new trial. An
inconsequential omission or a slight
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inaccuracy in the record which would not
materially affect appellate counsel's
preparation of the appeal or which would not
contribute to an appellate court's improper
determination of an appeal do not rise to
such magnitude as to require ipso facto
reversal. Error in transcript preparation or
production, like error in trial procedures, is
subject to the harmless-error rule.
401 N.W.2d at 752.
This Court has allowed a trial court to ireconstruct a
record, even without the stipulation of the parties, in a
circumstance in which no record was ever made.

In State v.

Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), a capital homicide case, this
Court remanded the matter to the district court to.supplement the
record with record of a proceeding which had not been reported.
Quoting an earlier decision, this Court said:
[WJe deem it safe and proper to assume that
proceedings have been carried on in
conformity with the law. Accordingly, when
there is no transcript as to what happened,
we indulge that presumption; and in the
absence of persuasive proof, the trial
court as the finder of the facts is not
obliged to find to the contrary.

If it appears that there is any reasonable
likelihood that there was some substantial
failure to accord the accused the
protections our law affords, or that there
may have been a miscarriage of justice
. . . then the best possible effort should
be made to reconstruct the record and
ascertain just what occurred. This
determination is to be made by the trial
court subject to the usual rules of
procedure, and review by this court.
Id. at 478 (quoting Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 49-50, 497
P.2d 856, 858 (1972) (citations omitted)); see also 57 A.L.R.4th
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1061; People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d 769, 773, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950) (no unfairness in placing burden on
appellant of showing either prejudicial error or that the record
so inadequate that he is unable to show error); People v.
Chessman, 52 Cal.2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, 690-92, cert, denied, 361
U.S. 925 (1959) (changes after reconstruction of the record were
numerous but they did not change the substance and nature of the
case; transcript substantially accurate and sufficiently
complete).

In the present case, a transcript was prepared.

While errors may be present in the transcript, they are either
insignificant or were capable of being corrected by application
of the procedures of rule 11(h).

Such correction could have been

accomplished by the proposed modifications of the record at the
trial court; however, these proposed modifications were not
always accepted by defendant.
While appeal in this matter was originally pending
before this Court, defendant filed a motion to set aside judgment
and/or for a new trial on November 15, 1989 in the Third District
Court (R. at 1222-28).

A memorandum and affidavits in support of

the motion were also filed (R. at 1229-1444).

An affidavit by

defendant's counsel listed a number of "discrepancies" and gave
examples of material which counsel felt was erroneous (R. at
1256-62).

The Third District Court determined that it did not

have jurisdiction and sent the matter to this Court (R. at 1466
and 1498-99).

Several documents were filed in this Court,

including record modifications proposed by defendant (Def. Exh.
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#33).

In response to the proposed modifications, the State

stipulated to striking comments made by the prosecutor found at
R. 3273-75, agreeing that the comments were placed on the record
at a time when court was not in session and was done outside of
the presence of the court and of the jury (Def. Exh. #33). The
State also stipulated to the other word changes proposed by
defendant (Def. Exh. #33 and R. 1935 at 43-46).

This Court

subsequently remanded this matter to the trial court to settle
the record (R. at 1541).
During the evidentiary hearings conducted by the trial
court, defendant continued to argue that the transcript could not
be corrected (R. at 1572-1606 and R. 1166 and 1185 [transcripts
of hearings conducted March 9 and 23, 1990]).

The State pointed

out that it had stipulated to the requested word changes in the
transcripts, although only one of the changes appeared to be of
any significance (R. at 1663-64).

The court continued to conduct

hearings, asking the parties to "go over" the record and
determine what errors existed and tell the court why the errors
were consequential (R. at 1935-36 and 1186-90 [transcripts of
hearings conducted June 4, July 6, September 17, September 24,
and October 22, 1990]).

At the June 4 hearing, the court stated

that, of the errors pointed out to that date, he found none to be
of consequence (R. 1936 at 16). At the October 22, 1990,
hearing, the State represented that one of the prosecutors,
Richard MacDougall, had read the transcripts and had not found
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the transcripts to be as deficient as defense counsel had
indicated (R. 1190 at 5 ) .
On November 7, 1990, Judge Uno conducted a hearing on
the status of the case. At that time, Judge Uno said:
I have read through all the transcripts. And
based on my reading through the transcripts
and the errors I've seen, I could find
nothing in there that I think five Supreme
Court justices and their law clerks couldn't
correct if they're real substantial errors
[sic].
So I thought that we could do [sic], is if
there are errors that you think are
substantial that need for the attorneys to
get together with the court, that we'll just
confine it to just those. Because most of
the transcript, I didn't have any trouble
with whatsoever, and the errors that were
errors were quite glaring. You look at it
and you know it's a mistake, a spelling,
typo, punctuation, some kind of grammar, name
[sic].
But as far as the text itself is
concerned, there was nothing in there that I
could not understand. So there may be
something that you people may have detected
that I might have gone over, but I've read
through the whole transcript, and there are a
lot of errors in there, different types, but
nothing that I felt was prejudicial.
(R. 1191 at 3).

The court was prepared to certify the transcript

as correct to this Court at that point (R. 1191 at 9-11).

In

spite of those statements by the court, the court allowed Ms. Lee
to continue to proofread the transcript under the scrutiny of
agents for both parties (R. 1191 at 8-10).
On November 30, 1990, the State proposed modifications
in the record; there is no indication in the record of a response
by defendant (R. at 1788-89).

On December 3, 1990, the court

conducted another hearing at which defense counsel testified
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about the corrections and changes in the transcript which arose
as Ms. Lee proofread it (R. 1931 [transcript of hearing conducted
December 3, 1990]).

At the conclusion of the evidence and

arguments, the court again asked counsel to indicate what
significant errors remained and try to reach an agreement
regarding those errors (R. 1931 at 249). If counsel could not
agree, the court would then look at the specific areas indicated
and would determine if the record could be corrected (R. 1931 at
248).

The State offered to submit a list of proposed changes;

defendant argued that a correct record could not be formulated
and asked the court to grant the new trial (R. 1931 at 249-51).
After reviewing the matter further, the trial court concluded
that the errors pointed out by counsel were correctable if
counsel would assist (R. 1931 at 261). The court had a concern
with only a few of the denoted errors; otherwise, he was again
prepared to certify the transcript at that point (R. 1931 at
264).
Defendant filed a second proposal of modifications on
December 17, 1990 (R. at 1818-1908).

On December 19, 1990, the

State filed a proposal of modifications (R. at 1915-28).
Defendant responded by stipulating to some of the State's
modifications and pointing out other concerns (R. at 1909-14).
At a final hearing on December 19, 1990, the parties indicated
some stipulated changes (R. 1932 at 5).

After a further attempt

to settle the record word for word, the parties stipulated that
the original transcript and the "California" transcript would be
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certified to this Court for review of the transcript issue (R.
1932 at 78).
Defendant has failed throughout these proceedings to
point out any significant uncorrectable errors in the transcript
which make it impossible for this Court to review his conviction.
All of his allegations either do not point out any error or point
to insignificant mistakes which do not change the sense of the
transcript.
He first alleges that the reporter stopped reporting
questions and admonitions during voir dire and that the note
reader created portions of the voir dire (Brief of"Appellant
[hereafter Br. of App.] at 23-29).

He apparently bases this

claim on the fact that Ms. Lee used asterisks to signify when
certain repetitive questions were asked or admonitions given.
Shorthand reporting is the "use of symbols or abbreviations" to
record legal proceedings.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-14 (1987).

Ms.

Lee used asterisks to denote certain questions and admonitions
which were repeated by the court (R. 1931 at 31-32).

Defense

counsel admits that she prepared a "script" for the court to use,
and that counsel agreed that the reporter would not have to make
notes for the repetitive script that the court used on voir dire
(R. 1931 at 30). It is apparent from the trial record, and
counsel admits, that the court went through the same questions
with each prospective juror (Transcript of trial2 [hereafter
2

References to the trial transcript are to the "California"
version. Recourse to the interlineated transcript is helpful to
understand defendant's allegations.
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Tr.] at 178, 243, 260, 271, 322 and 330 and R. 1931 at 33).
Instead of preparing word for word notations of the repeated
questions, Ms. Lee may have merely used the asterisk symbol to
indicate that the question was being repeated for each juror.
That use of symbols to indicate a repeated question which then
could be transcribed verbatim when the record was prepared is no
different than the use of symbols for the individual words or
sounds.

The same purpose is accomplished; the question, as asked

by the court, is placed in the notes to be transcribed at a later
time.
Defendant next contends that questi ons and juror
responses "do not make sense," and he infers that the reporter
did not report the questions correctly (Br. of App> at 24). The
transcript citations given do not bear out this conclusion.

Some

of the responses by prospective jurors may have been less than
articulate but that does not support the conclusion that the
reporter erred.

People are not always totally articulate when

answering questions in front of a group.

The responses did not

appear to confuse the court or counsel in most cases; the
questioning continued.

The response on page 215 cited by

defendant did trigger further discussion betvzeen counsel and the
court at page 268.

Counsel sought clarification of that response

(Tr. at 268). Defendant has not told this Court how these
responses have prejudiced his ability to appeal his conviction.
The same is true of his claim that the reporter denoted
by asterisks the court's admonishment not to discuss the case.
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Defendant does not claim that the jury was not admonished or that
they did not abide by the admonishment.

Consequently, how the

admonishment was recorded is not significant to defendant's
appeal.
Defendant has also not shown why the fact that the note
reader had copies of the police report, the trial judge's notes,
and the autopsy report is significant (Br. of App. at 28). The
citation to a description of a person supposedly taken from a
police report is citation to a proffer by defense counsel out of
the presence of the jury (Tr. at 2238).

The proffer was of

hearsay testimony of a person who was deceased and, based on the
proffer, the court allowed a detective to testify to the hearsay
(Tr. at 2243-44).

Defendant has not shown that possible error in

reporting counsel's proffer is significant to an appellate issue.
The testimony defendant sought to admit by use of the proffer was
admitted.

A review of the next citation given by defendant does

not show that there was any correction by the reporter; the
testimony indicates that the witness cannot explain an elevenmonth discrepancy between two occurrences (Tr. at 2264-66).

The

final citation in this paragraph is to the transcript of the
judge reciting from the notes he had taken of defendant's
circumstances as part of the court's judgment (Tr. at 3248-61).
Defendant does not demonstrate any error on the page cited which
impacts his appellate review (Tr. at 3261).
Defendant lists "other examples" of transcript which
the note reader supposedly "made up" (Br. of App. at 28). The
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majority of the citations are to pages in which the court
admonished prospective jurors not to discuss the case and the
transcript indicates one juror leaving and another entering the
room for individual voir dire.

The reporter indicated these

occurrences by use of asterisks which the note reader then
interpreted and filled in with the words appropriate to what was
occurring at the time.

The note reader did not "make up"

occurrences in the court.

Of the other pages cited, some have no

indication that there is error; others demonstrate, in the
"California" version, that Ms. Lee read some of the symbols
differently than the note reader had.

The State sought to

stipulate to a correct reading of some of these "errors," but
defendant declined to do so (R. at 1909-28).

All of the examples

cited by defendant can be understood in context and are either
insignificant or easily correctable.
Some of the examples cited by defendant are contained
in the argument of counsel at trial.

During the hearings on the

transcript issue, defendant called these significant because of
the doctrine of waiver; i.e., they argued that they would be
barred if a faulty transcript did not preserve their arguments,
thus failing to preserve an issue for appeal (R. 1931 at 79). In
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated
a "death penalty exception to the contemporaneous objection
rule."

JEd.. at 552 (footnote omitted).

In death penalty cases,

this Court will address arguments raised for the first time on
appeal; consequently, defendant's argument that errors in the
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transcript may waive his right to appeal an issue is without
merit.

In any event, the supposed errors in reporting counsel's

arguments are so minor that they do not preclude this Court from
recognizing the issues argued and preserved below.
Defendant argues that portions of the transcript are
"unintelligible" (Br. of App. at 33). He specifically cites to
instances of argument by counsel and testimony by witness
Britton.

A reading of each of the citations given in his brief

demonstrates that the arguments about Britton's testimony and
about introduction of defendant's prison record are extensive
enough that, even with minor errors in a particular sentence, the
argument counsel made is clear.

Even if this Court did apply the

doctrine of waiver in death penalty cases, the arguments of
counsel are so extensive that the grounds upon which the
arguments are based are clear in the transcript.

The testimony

of Britton may not be articulate; however, the State offered to
stipulate to correct any errors.

The context of the statements

make the correct reading clear and also demonstrate that the
errors are insignificant to defendant's appellate issue on the
use of Britton's preliminary hearing testimony.

Any errors in

Britton's testimony, even if they were significant, could be
corrected.

The same is true of defendant's argument regarding

admission of defendant's prison record.
The citations given by defendant in reference to his
challenges to jurors for cause simply do not support his
allegation that the questions and answers were unintelligible
-27-

(Br. of App. at 33).

The transcript at the record citations

present a clear view of the jurors's answers.

Defendant's

argument appears to go more to the fact that the court asked
rehabilitating questions to clarify each prospective juror's
answers.

If the questions appeared to confuse the juror or the

juror gave conflicting answers, such is not the fault of the
reporter or the transcript.

Again, defendant charges that the

note reader made up voir dire answers for the jurors.
nothing in the record to support that allegation.

There is

The only

material arguably not in the reporter's original notes at the
citation given by defendant is the court's admonition not to
discuss the case.

The presence of the admonition is indicated by

asterisks; there is no indication that the note reader fabricated
voir dire answers (Tr. at 751-52).
The catchall paragraphs regarding other unintelligible
portions of the transcript found on page 34 of defendant's brief
have no merit for the reasons already given.

The citations are

to opening statement, argument of counsel, testimony outside the
presence of the jury of a "shakedown" of defendant's cell during
trial, or to other matters which are not significant for
defendant's appellate review.
Defendant challenges number and name discrepancies
between the original transcript and the "California" version (Br.
of App. at 35). Unless names are spelled for the reporter,
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mistakes in spelling may occur.3

Unless the spelling of a name

is significant to the appeal, a discrepancy in a name is not
grounds for a new trial. As to the number issue, one citation
given by defendant does not exist in the record (3656).

The

majority of the citations are to numbers which have no
significance for appellate review, such as whether the court
called a ten or a fifteen minute recess (Tr. at 887), or the page
number of a case cited to the court in argument by counsel (Tr.
at 1920 and 2704).

All of the numbers given in testimony can be

read correctly in the context of the testimony where they are
found.

The State sought to stipulate to the logical readings of

testimony such as IQ percentiles during the penalty phase, and
such words as "archive" and "Rorschach test," but defendant
declined to stipulate (Tr. at 2040, 3035 and 3061).

The dates

and times of certain occurrences can be reconstructed from the
context of the testimony and from documentary evidence which was
stipulated to at trial (Tr. at 1604 and 1888).

Defendant

declined to use these means to reconcile discrepancies in the
record (R. 1931 at 159).

3

Even the transcripts of the hearings conducted in 1990 on
the transcript issues bear this point out. One reporter spelled
the first name of defense counsel "Brook" and another spelled it
"Brooke."
(R. 1188 and 1932 at the "Appearances" pages).
As
significant as the spelling of ones name is to a person, if there
is no confusion about the person referred to, a misspelling is not
significant for appellate review. Defendant has not alleged that
any misspelled name is grounds for appeal.
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None of the other issues raised by defendant in Point
II B of his brief raise any claim that material of significance
was left out of the trial transcripts,
C. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 Does Not Require a
Perfect Transcript for Appellate Review.
Defendant next argues that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2)
requires a verbatim accurate transcript for appellate review.
However, this statute simply establishes an event, receipt of the
entire record, from which the time for review begins to run.

It

does not define what is considered to be the record on appeal.
As argued above, the requirement is for an adequate record, a
record of sufficient completeness to allow proper consideration
of defendant's claims.

" A 'record of sufficient completeness'

does not translate automatically into a complete verbatim
transcript. . . .

'Alternative methods of reporting trial

proceedings are permissible if they place before the appellate
court an equivalent report of the events at trial from which the
appellant's contentions arise.'"

Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189,

194 (1971) (quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S., at 495-496).
The record provided in this case was determined to be adequate to
provide defendant appellate review and defendant has not shown
that this conclusion by the trial court is incorrect.

Since the

transcript has been determined to be accurate enough for review,
the statutory provision relating to mandatory review has not been
violated.
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POINT III
BECAUSE THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ADEQUATE FOR
REVIEW, DEFENDANT IS NOT PREJUDICED BY USE OF
IT.
Defendant argues that he will be prejudiced by the use
of either the original or the "California" transcript and
reiterates the arguments made in Point II. The voir dire issue
has been shown to be without substance and will not be addressed
again in this point.
Defendant points to specific numbers in the transcript
to argue that their "unreliability" prejudices him.

Early in the

transcript, the parties argued the availability of witness
Britton because the State was seeking to admit Britton's
preliminary hearing testimony through use of a transcript (Tr. at
12-23).

Defendant claims that it is impossible to determine the

rule of evidence which was being argued because there is one
reference to a rule "45" in the transcript (Tr. at 15). The
previous transcript page clearly states that the motion is
pursuant to rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence, a rule which
provides exceptions to the hearsay rule (Tr. at 14). Ms.
Palacios enumerates the subsections of rule 804(a)* on page 14
and 15. A reference to "45" is immediately followed by a
statement of the text of subsection (5) of rule 804(a) (Tr. at

* On page 14, reference is made to a rule "804.82" which, in
context, obviously refers to 804(a)(2). The similarity in sound
between "8" and "a" when spoken possibly explains the discrepancy.
In any case, Ms. Palacios read the text of 804(a)(2) after the
reference to "804.82" and the correct reading of the number is
clear.
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15).

This explanation was given by Mr. MacDougall at the hearing

to settle the transcript but was rejected by defense counsel (R.
1932 at 49-52).

The context of the argument clearly informs this

Court of the argument which was being raised such that, even if
this Court did apply waiver, the issue was obviously preserved.
The confusion about the year in which Nicole Arnold
delivered a social security card to the police is a function of
the testimony itself, not the transcription.

Witness Duffy's

original testimony was that the card was found in December of
1986 (Tr. at 1508).

On cross-examination, he gave the year as

1987 (Tr. at 1514).

The rest of the testimony by Duffy and by

witness Franks show confusion about the year of the occurrence
(Tr. at 1506-18).

That confusion may be the basis for an

appellate issue (although testimony from the police agency
regarding the day it was turned over to them, which was the same
day it was found, may clarify the date), but the confusion came
from the witnesses themselves, not from the reporter.

An actual

discrepancy in the years which may be attributable to the
reporter can be clarified by the context of the dates given on
pages 1514-15.

Reference is made to "sometime in 1986 [1987],

being several months ago, or was it given to you in 1987 [1986],
up to a year and some months ago?"

(Tr. at 1514-15).

From the

internal context of that question, the correct order of the years
can be determined.
The testimony of dates relating to witness Britton's
federal sentencing is also clarified by looking at the dates in
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the context of the rest of the testimony.

Page 2011 is not

testimony, but a statement by counsel of a contact between
Britton's attorney and the State which occurred after the
preliminary hearing (Tr. at 2011).

Page 2038 refers to a contact

prior to the preliminary hearing during which Britton's attorney
noted that the prosecutor would sign a favorable affidavit after
Britton's testimony (Tr. at 2038-39).

The date on page 2039 was

two months after the previous contacts and refers to a date just
prior to a federal hearing on Britton.

On that date, Britton's

attorney called the prosector's office and received assurance
that the prosecutor would appear at Britton's hearing (Tr. at
2039-40).

Read in context, the significant facts about whether

Britton had received a benefit for testifying are in the
transcript.

The specific dates of contact between Britton's

attorney and the prosecutor do not appear to be significant.
The date that Officer Valdez found the identification
cards in the jail is not given with specificity by the officer
himself.

He was clear that the identification was found two or

three days after February 24th (Tr. at 1602-1604).

He worked the

week of February 24; the date that he did not work was correctly
changed to February 22 when the transcript was proofread (Tr. at
1600 and 1604).
The distance from which witness Larrabee saw defendant
at Storm Mountain varied at different times because Larrabee saw
defendant more than once (Tr. at 1198-1202).

On page 1198, the

distance is either 50 yards or 20 yards; in any event, Larrabee
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used the courtroom as a reference and indicated that the distance
was about twice the length of the courtroom (Tr. at 1198).

This

gave the jury a better frame of reference for the distance than
the number of yards.

The date on which a composite drawing was

done (Tr. at 1703) can be corrected by reference to the testimony
given by Larrabee.

He testified that he assisted in the

composite on Wednesday afternoon after Maureen Hunsaker's body
was found (Tr. at 1205).

Wednesday was February 26, the number

to which the reporter corrected the transcript (Tr. at 1703 and
R. at 356).
The date on page 1875 cannot be February 20. The
officer's testimony is that he spoke with defendant about his
whereabouts on Sunday, February 23; obviously, this conversation
could not have taken place on February 20 (Tr. at 1875-76).

The

interview occurred before a search warrant was executed on
defendant's apartment; the execution of the warrant occurred at
11:45 p.m. on February 28, 1988 (Tr. at 1875 and R. at 359). The
approximate location of where defendant claims to have picked up
a hitchhiker and where they supposedly became mired do not appear
to be significant to the issues defendant has indicated he will
raise on appeal (Br. of App. at Addendum M ) . The stipulation to
the time of booking can be corrected by reference to the booking
sheet which was being used at the time of the stipulation (Tr. at
1888-89).

As Ms. Palacios pointed out to the court, the time

given was the booking time, not necessarily the time that booking
was completed (Tr. at 1889).

Since the time does not necessarily
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demonstrate the completion of booking, the thirty minute
difference between the note reader's time and the reporter's does
not "demonstrate that Mr. Menzies did not have time to secrete
the identification cards later found in jail laundry" (Br. of
App. at 40). The discrepancy, even if it could not be corrected,
is not significant.

The reference to page 2620 for a question of

how much money was missing is a reference to the State's closing
argument, not to evidence.

The discrepancy is between whether

the prosecutor said it was "between $115 and $116 missing" or
"between $114 and $116 missing" (Tr. at 2620).

There is no

significance in that discrepancy in the closing argument of
counsel.
In the penalty phase, Dr. Winkelman was listing the
agencies with which he had worked in order to become an expert in
his field (Tr. at 2956-65).

Logic indicates that he would

probably have worked with 100 people in a pilot project; however,
whether it was one person or one hundred is not significant in
the context of the testimony establishing his credentials.

As to

testimony of defendant's IQ percentile, the witness testified
that defendant was functioning "in the average range of
intellectual functioning" (Tr. at 3035).
percentile would be "50th."

Obviously, that

The other percentiles were for

comparative purposes and they have little, if any, significance
for appellate review.
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The claim about "unintelligible" arguments by counsel
during the discussion about Britton's testimony has been
addressed previously.
All of the citations to the reporter's alleged
inability to read her notes can be read in the context in which
they are found (Br. of App. at 41).

The meaning of the words and

symbols become clear when read with the rest of the testimony.
The "second diagnosis" on page 3079 comes from an exhibit which
defendant introduced into evidence (Tr. at 3079 and 3105).
Whatever the diagnosis was, it is in evidence as an exhibit; the
testimony on page 3079 only goes to Dr. DeCaria's opinion based
on the diagnoses given in the exhibit.

His opinion is the

significant material, not what he said the second diagnosis was.
The court's record indicates that all witnesses were
sworn; the fact that the transcript does not name which witnesses
were sworn at the time that the exclusionary rule was invoked is
not significant.

The court clerk noted that the witnesses were

sworn and either testified or did not (R. at 802-803).

There is

no indication that any witness testified without being sworn.
POINT IV
THIS TRANSCRIPT IS ADEQUATE FOR APPELLATE
REVIEW; CONSEQUENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN NO
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
Points IV, V, VI, and VII of defendant's brief allege
that use of the transcript of his trial is a violation of various
federal and state constitutional rights.
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A.

There is No Violation of the Federal Constitution.

As noted above, the federal constitution requires a
record of "'sufficient completeness' to permit proper
consideration of [defendant's] claims." Mayer v. Chicago, 404
U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499
(1963)).

If the record meets that test, it does not violate any

of the provisions of the federal constitution.

As has been

argued with specificity previously in the brief, this transcript
is sufficient to allow review of defendant's claims.

Defendant

has not shown that this record is inadequate; consequently, he
has not demonstrated any violation of his federal constitutional
rights.
B. Defendant Has Not Provided Analysis for a Different
Construction of the State Constitution.
Defendant also claims that the use of this transcript
violates his rights under the Utah Constitution.

He does not

indicate what standard of transcript adequacy that this court
should apply under the state constitution which would be
different than the standard under the federal constitution.

He

simply states that this Court has previously noted that the Utah
Constitution may provide different protection than its federal
counterpart.

This allegation is an insufficient basis upon which

to create, out of whole cloth, protections which defendant fails
to define.

Because defendant has failed to analyze a different

standard under the state constitution, this Court should decline
to conduct state constitutional analysis.
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988).

State v. Laffertv, 749

While the case of State v.
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Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is not controlling in
this Court, it is a case in which the court of appeals addressed
a similar issue.

In that case, the court held that a transcript

prepared by a substitute reporter from the notes of an absent
reporter did not deprive Jonas of rights under the Utah
Constitution, JEci. at 910 and n. 9.

The transcript in the present

case is adequate for appellate review under both constitutions.
POINT V
THE STATE HAS ALREADY STIPULATED TO REMOVAL
OF CERTAIN OF THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS; NO
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THIS ISSUE IS REQUIRED.
Defendant's final point refers to a statement by one of
the prosecutors which he asked the reporter to take down on May
16, 19 88, nearly two months after defendant was sentenced (Tr. at
3273-75).

The State stipulated on December 18, 1989, that the

comments would be stricken (Def. Exh. #33). The comments are now
excluded and do not violate defendant's rights; they would no
longer be in the record but for defendant's insistence that they
remain in the record for his own purposes (Def. Exh. #33).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the trial court's determination that the
record is adequate for appellate review.
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